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The Celotex Trilogy Revisited: How
Misapplication of the Federal
Summary Judgment Standard is
Undermining the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
The Honorable David H. Simmons,* Stephen J. Jacobs,**
Daniel J. O'Malley,*** and Richard H. Tami****
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States decided three
cases that redefined the standards pertaining to summary judgment
motions: MatsushitaElec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,' Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,2 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.3 In the eighteen
years since that time, however, numerous district courts and courts of
appeals, although paying lip service to the principles articulated in this
"trilogy" of cases (the "Celotex trilogy" or "1986 trilogy"), have struggled
to uniformly apply these cases in a consistent manner and have instead taken widely divergent positions regarding various aspects of
their application. In some cases, certain district courts and courts of
appeals have flatly failed to apply the mandate of those cases.
During that same eighteen year period, the number of federal
civil trials has dropped sharply from a high of 12,529 in 1985-one
year before the trilogy was decided-to what was then an all time low
*
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1. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

3.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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of 4,569 in 2002. 4 The declining trend has continued, as shown by the
following table representing the total number of federal civil trials and
total number of jury trials during the four most recent 12 month periods ending on March 31:
Time
Period
April
Alril
April
April

1,
1,
1,
1,

2000
2001
2002
2003

to
to
to
to

March
March
March
March

31,
31,
31,
31,

2001
2002
2003
2004

Total Number of
Federal Civil Trials

Number of
Federal Civil Jury Trials

5,782
4,766
4,321
4,100

3,8605
3,1126
2,8117
2,6228

Prior to the trilogy in 1986, the trend for the previous two decades had been an increase in the number of federal civil trials, which
increase peaked in 1985-one year before the trilogy was decidedwhen there were 12,529 federal civil trials. 9 Since 1985, the number of
federal civil trials has plummeted by more than 60%.lo This marked
drop in the number of federal civil trials is inversely proportional to the
rapid growth in all other aspects of the legal profession, including the
sheer number of lawyers, money spent on litigation, and increased volume of legal authority."
Numerous factors have been suggested for the sharp decline in
the number of trials in district courts, including the increased cost of
trial, fear of the uncertainty of litigation, the rise of alternative dispute
resolution, use of class actions and multi-district litigation, and a
change in the type of cases being filed. 12 One commentator has noted
that the decrease in federal civil trials is "consistent with a documented increase in the prevalence of summary judgment," 13 and that
4. Shari Seidman Diamond and Jessica Bina, Puzzles about Supply-Side
Explanations for Vanishing Trials: A New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 637, 638 (2004).
5. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2001, March 31, 2001, Table C-4, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2001/tables/c04mar01.pdf.
6. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2002, March 31, 2002, Table C-4, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2002/tables/cO4mar02.pdf.
7. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2003, March 31, 2003, Table C-4, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2003/tables/C04Mar03.pdf.
8. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2004, March 31, 2004, Table C-4, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/C04Mar04.pdf.
9. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462 (2004).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1.
12. Diamond and Bina, supra note 4, at 638.
13. Galanter, supra, note 9, at 35.

CELOTEX TRILOGY REVISITED

20061

certain data suggests that we may have moved into "a new era in
which dispositions by summary judgment are a magnitude several
14
times greater than the number of trials."
It is this commentator's opinion, however, that, although many
of the above-referenced factors may have contributed to this decline, a
major factor-if not the major factor-behind this decline, is the overzealous use of the summary judgment mechanism, which district
courts have utilized beyond that which was contemplated by the Supreme Court in 1986.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
CAUSED BY THE TRILOGY

Prior to the trilogy in 1986, the Supreme Court jealously protected the right to a jury trial and frequently held that summary judgment should not be used to undermine that right. The case of Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 15 is illustrative. In Poller, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia had entered
summary judgment in an antitrust case. In reversing the summary
judgment, the Supreme Court recited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 and then stated:
This rule authorizes summary judgment 'only where moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is clear what the
truth is, ...(and where) no general issue remains for trial ... (for)
the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off
from their right of
6
trial by jury if they really have issues to try."

The Court further stated that "... summary procedures should be used
sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspira17
tors, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot."
Likewise, in its decisions in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover",
and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 19 the Supreme Court demonstrated its
commitment to "protect the constitutional right to a jury trial" by limiting the discretion of a trial judge to decide issues that may infringe
14.

Id. at 36.

15.

Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).

16. Id. at 467 (citing Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944)
(emphasis added).
17.

Id. at 473 (emphasis added).

18.

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).

19.

Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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upon that right. 20 This commitment was reinforced by this Court's
pre-trilogy decisions pertaining to the entry of summary judgment, including Poller,2 1 FirstNationalBank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co. ,22
23
and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.
When the trilogy was decided in 1986, the Supreme Court felt
compelled to clarify the existing summary judgment standards delineated by the foregoing cases, not create new standards. Each of the trilogy cases added its own element to the clarification. Matsushita
requires that a moving party's evidence be sufficient to render the nonmoving party's claim implausible. 24 Anderson permits a district court
to enter summary judgment if the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient, under the applicable law, to convince the trial judge that a
jury could return in the non-moving party's favor. 25 Celotex made it
easier under Rule 56 to shift the burden to the non-moving party to
producing evidence in support of its position. 26 In other words, Celotex
simplified making a Rule 56 motion, while Anderson and Matsushita
27
increased the likelihood that the motion will be granted.
The 1986 trilogy, however, did not and should not undermine
the longstanding commitment to protect the jury trial right. In Anderson, the Court stated that "[o]ur holding.., does not denigrate the role
20.
21.

Id. at 472; Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510.
Poller, 368 U.S. at 473.
[S]ummary judgment procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust
litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the
hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only
when the witnesses are present and subject to cross examination that their
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by
affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of
'even handed justice'.

Id.
22. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 304 (1968) ("[T]he
summary judgment technique tempts judges to take over the jury trial of cases, thus
depriving parties of their constitutional right to trial by jury.").
23. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 176 (1970).
The right to confront, cross-examine and impeach adverse witnesses is one of the
most fundamental rights sought to be preserved by the Seventh Amendment
provision for jury trials in civil cases. The advantages of trial before a live jury with
live witnesses, and all the possibilities of considering the human factors, should not
be eliminated by substituting trial by affidavit and the sterile bareness of summary
judgment.
Id.
24. Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment: Are the "LitigationExplosion,"
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichs Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge
.... "28 In Celotex, the majority stated that "Rule 56 must be construed
with due regard.., for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried before a jury .... "29
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's stated desire to preserve
the right to a jury trial, when deciding the trilogy, certain members of
the Supreme Court accurately predicted that district courts would
struggle to apply the mandates of their decisions. In his dissent in Anderson, for example, Justice William Brennan opined that it was difficult if not impossible to draw the line between impermissible weighing
of the evidence and determining whether the evidence was sufficient to
be presented to a jury. According to Justice Brennan:
I simply cannot square the direction that the judge "is not himself
to weigh the evidence" with the direction that the judge also bear in
mind the "quantum" of proof required and consider whether the evidence is of sufficient "caliber or quantity" to meet that "quantum." I
would have thought that a determination of the "caliber and quantity," i.e., the importance and value, of the evidence in light of the
"quantum," i.e., amount "required," could only be performed by
30
weighing the evidence.
He further observed that if a trial judge weighed the evidence on a
summary judgment motion, then "concerns are raised concerning the
constitutional rights of civil litigants to a jury trial."3 1 Finally, Justice
Brennan predicted the difficulties that lower courts would face in implementing the principles articulated in Anderson when he stated that
".. . it is the district courts and courts of appeals that must struggle to
clean up after us." 32 Numerous other commentators have echoed Justice Brennan's comments and criticized the trilogy as inviting lower
courts to weigh the evidence on summary judgment. 3 3 Justice Bren28.
29.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.
33. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 24; Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and
Circumstantial Evidence, 40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 501-504 (1988); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A
Distorted Mirror:The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed
Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 137-140 (1988); Brain L.
Weakland, Summary Judgment in Federal Practice: Super Motion v. Classic Model of
Epistemic Coherence, 94 DICK. L. REV. 25, 35 (1989); Nancy Levit, The Caseload
30.
31.
32.
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nan also identified another critical issue concerning the moving party's
burden in his Celotex dissent:
[T]he Court has not clearly explained what is required of a moving
party seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case .... This lack of clarity is unfortunate: district courts must routinely decide summary judgment
34
motions, and the Court's opinion will very likely create confusion.
Over the last 18 years, the predictions articulated in the dissents in Anderson and Celotex have proven to be visionary. As such,
the Supreme Court should fortify its commitment to the Seventh
Amendment right of a litigant to have his or her lawsuit resolved by a
trial before a jury of his or her peers and clarify the proper role of the
summary judgment mechanism. That is the only way to restore the
proper balance between the two, such that summary judgment only
terminates litigation where there is no doubt about what is the truth.

III.

THE APPLICATION OF THE TRILOGY

When confronted with a summary judgment motion, every federal court recites the fundamental requirements of granting summary
judgment, as outlined in the trilogy. Summary judgment is only
proper when no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 35 A judge may not weigh the evidence. 36 The evidence of the
nonmovant is to be believed. 37 All reasonable inferences must be
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 38 The court may not make
credibility determinations. 3 9 Although some or all of these statements
are faithfully recited in most district court opinions involving summary
judgment, it appears that, in many cases, the very courts who recite
these statements are not adhering to their mandate.
Several cases demonstrate that federal courts are improperly
weighing evidence, making credibility determinations, and drawing inferences against the nonmoving party-activities that all violate the
1986 trilogy and the plain requirements of Rule 56. In Aschinger v.
Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint, and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 321, 329 (1989).
34.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 329 (Brennan, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).
35. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
36. Id. at 249.
37. Id. at 255.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Columbus Showcase Co.,40 for example, a retired director of a closely
held corporation brought an action for fraud against the corporation
and his brother, another director of the corporation. 4 1 The plaintiff
had sold his stock to his brother at $50 per share. At issue was the
defendant brother's representations to the plaintiff that he would "take
the same deal" if he was the seller instead of the buyer. 4 2 Six years
later, the defendant brother sold the stock at a substantially higher
price, $338 per share. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant's brother, and the Sixth Circuit, in weighing
the evidence before it, affirmed the ruling of the district court, stating
that "[w]e find it unlikely that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the brother's remark] to be "material."43 The Court also found
the plaintiffs reliance on the statement to be "unreasonable."4 4 Finally the Court concluded that there was no evidence of an intent to
defraud, because the price disparity in the stock, by itself, was insuffi45
cient to show knowledge of falsity.
It is apparent that, in Aschinger, the Sixth Circuit improperly
drew inferences in favor of the moving party and made a factual determination that should have been left for a jury. After all, it is not unreasonable to rely on a brother's statement that he would sell stock at
the same price for which he is proposing to buy it. Further, the mere
disparity in price gives rise to the reasonable inference-which the district court was required to draw in favor of the non-moving party-that
the defendant brother was lying to the plaintiff when he made the
statement at issue. As such, summary judgment should have been denied and the matter should have gone to trial. Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit's analysis of what a reasonable shareholder would find "material" invades the jury's province.
Likewise, in Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pennsylvania,46 the parents of an individual who committed suicide while in
police custody sued the City and certain members of the City's police
force. The decedent, who had a history of suicide attempts, hanged
himself with his belt while incarcerated. In order to prevail, the plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that the defendants acted with "deliberate
indifference" towards the possibility of suicide. The plaintiffs intro40.
41.
42.
43.

Aschinger v. Columbus Showcase Co., 934 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1410.
Id.
Id.

44.

Id.

45.
46.

Aschinger, 934 F.2d at 1410.
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pennsylvania, 891 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1990).
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duced testimony from one officer that the decedent's history of suicide
attempts was "widely known" in the police department. 4 7 The defendants introduced evidence showing that the officers had no knowledge of
the decedent's history. 48 Despite this clear factual dispute, the district
court granted the defendants' summary judgment motion and the
Third Circuit affirmed, stating that, although the case was "extremely
close," the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could have concluded that the officers knew about the
decedent's history. 49 The Third Circuit even conceded that the plaintiffs had introduced "some circumstantial evidence tending to show deliberate indifference," but that was not "enough [evidence] to survive
summary judgment." 50 The Third Circuit was required to draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and was not at liberty to discount the
evidence supporting the inference of deliberate indifference. Instead,
however, it improperly weighed the evidence and incorrectly substituted summary judgment for a jury trial.
In Aschinger and Williams, the circuit courts of appeals affirmed the decisions of the district courts, in essence ratifying the improper use of the summary judgment standard. In Leonard v. Dixie
Well Service & Supply, Inc.,51 conversely, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, thereby correcting
the error of the district court. In granting summary judgment, the district court had characterized the defendant's evidence as "impressive
and comprehensive" while labeling the plaintiffs evidence as "inaccurate and imprecise." 5 2 The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court impermissibly weighed the evidence:
The district judge erred in basing his decision on finding [defendant's] documentary evidence inherently more "reliable" or "accurate" than [plaintiffs evidence] .... [1]t is for the jury at trial, not
for the judge on a pretrial motion, to decide whose evidence is more
credible. A judge assessing the "persuasiveness" of evidence
presented on a motion for summary judgment may discount such
evidence as unspecific or immaterial, but not as unbelievable. 5 3
47.

Id. at 465.

48.

Id. at 465-66.

49.

Id. at 466.

50.

Id.

51.

Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1987).

52.

Id. at 293.

53.

Id. at 294.
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The Fifth Circuit's correction of the district court's error shows that the
Fifth Circuit's jurisprudence is clearly contrary to the holdings of the
Third Circuit in Williams and the Sixth Circuit in Aschinger.
In addition to weighing evidence, making credibility determinations, and drawing inferences against the non-moving party, some federal courts have also overzealously used summary judgment by
applying the so-called implausibility doctrine, by engaging in a piecemeal review of a nonmovant's evidence, and by impermissibly shifting
the burden of proof to the non-moving party by essentially requiring
that the non-moving party prove its case at the summary judgment
stage.
The implausibility doctrine, set forth in Matsushita, states that
summary judgment is not proper merely because one set of facts ap54
pears more plausible than that offered in opposition to the motion.
Some lower courts, however, have expanded the implausibility doctrine
with regard to assessing the "genuineness" of a nonmovant's economic
theory in an antitrust setting. In so doing, those courts have increased
the nonmovant's burden to oppose a summary judgment motion by requiring the nonmovant to present more compelling proof than that
which a jury would require in order to render a verdict.5 5 Further, in
the case of Luigino's v. Peterson,56 the Eighth Circuit improperly separated, isolated, and rejected in piecemeal fashion each facet of the nonmoving party's circumstantial evidence regarding the defendant/moving party's state of mind, rather than considering the cumulative effect
of the totality of that evidence. This violated the Supreme Court's directive that on a summary judgment motion the evidence must be reviewed by the court "as a whole." 57 The importance of the
comprehensive and cumulative review of circumstantial evidence, es54. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. See also Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1354
(8th Cir. 1997) (a movant is not entitled to judgment simply because the facts offered by it
appear more plausible than those facts tendered in opposition).
55. See, e.g. Knight v. Sharif, 875 F.2d 516, 523 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that plaintiff
could not provide plausible interpretation of disputed documents); Ryder Energy
Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 865 F.2d 492-93 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that plaintiff could not prove causation in breach-of-duty action); Cuesta v. Sch.
Bd., 285 F.3d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding that defendant did not need to introduce
evidence contradicting plaintiffs argument because argument itself was implausible).
56.

Luigino's v. Peterson, 317 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2003).

57. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. See also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust
Litigation, 295 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 505
(6th Cir. 1996); Wagner v. Wheeler, 13 F.3d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1993); Miller, supra note 24, at
1032, 1064, 1092-93; Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 73, 93 (1990); Collins, supra note 33, at 492.

10
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pecially in cases involving fraud, was recognized by the Supreme Court
over a century ago:
All experience shows that positive proof of fraudulent acts

...,

is

not generally to be expected, and it is for that reason, among others,
that the law allows in such controversies a resort to circumstances
as the means of ascertaining the truth, and the rule of evidence is
well settled that circumstances altogether inconclusive, if separately considered, may by their number and joint operation, especially when corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to
.58
constitute conclusive proof. ...
In addition, there are several instances in which federal courts
have appeared to apply Matsushita to authorize courts to weigh evidence at the summary judgment stage, in effect requiring the nonmovant to prove its case, not merely to demonstrate the existence of a
"genuine issue of material fact."59 Finally, it is not uncommon for district courts to misallocate the burden of persuasion on summary judgment, fail to consider the movant's burden before addressing the
nonmovant's burden, or, in violation of Anderson, fail to appreciate the
60
heightened burden.
58. Wager, et al. v. Hall, 83 U.S. 584, 601-602 (1872).
59. See, e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d 112, 121-32 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citing Matsushita in affirming grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs after
discounting plaintiffs' expert testimony and asserting that ordinary business practices were
just as likely explanations for exchanges of pricing information, discovery of competitors'
memoranda in defendants' files, and "truce" between defendants); Hayes v. Douglas
Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88 (lst Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiff provided insufficient
testimony of four expert witnesses, including two medical experts, in support of the
proposition that defendant's product was proximate cause of decedent's death); Zettle v.
Handy Mfg. Co., 998 F.2d 358, 362-63 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment in
products liability case in part because plaintiff failed to prove that death by electrocution
was foreseeable result of defendant's use of metal instead of plastic handle on its electric
washer, despite plaintiffs deposition of defendant's engineer who admitted that company
was aware that some of their customers tended to use out-of-date wiring systems, which
would heighten risk that electric currents would flow through handle); Wonder Labs, Inc. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 728 F. Supp. 1058, 1064-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (court granted summary
judgment in a trademark action by a toothbrush manufacturer having registered the mark
"Dentist's Choice" against a toothpaste manufacturer that used the term "dentist's choice"
in its advertising in part because plaintiff could not provide sufficient evidence of the
likelihood of confusion).
60. See, e.g., Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1993)
(reversing summary judgment where defendantlmovant did not satisfy its burden, and
therefore the burden did not shift back to plaintiff to provide supporting evidence); Jones v.
City of Columbus, Ga., 120 F.3d 248, 253-254 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary
judgment where district court did not address movant's initial burden before determining
whether nonmovants met their burden); Hagadorn v. M.F. Smith & Associates, Inc., 172
F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion) (reversing summary judgment where
defendant/movant failed to satisfy its "heightened" evidentiary burden); Hemstreet v.
Burroughs Corp., 861 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reversing summary judgment where the
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It is also important to note that the trilogy and the way in
which it is interpreted and applied not only affects litigation in the
federal judicial system, but also in numerous states. 6 1 California, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Arizona, and Tennessee, and the
District of Columbia,6 2 have adopted the standards for summary judg63
ment set forth in this Court's 1986 decisions.
District courts and courts of appeal are not uniformly applying
the summary judgment principles articulated in the 1986 trilogy. The
only thing consistent about the current application of the trilogy by
federal courts is the inconsistency of its application. Although the trilogy contains clear "qualifying language reaffirming the significance of
trials and juries, indicating that the three cases are not carte blanche
to the district courts[ ,1"64 at least one Circuit Court of Appeal, the
Sixth Circuit, has found that the trilogy, "taken in the aggregate, low65
ered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion."
Equally troubling is the fact that many of these federal courts
are impermissibly weighing evidence, construing inferences in favor of
the moving party, and making credibility determinations that deny litigants the ability to reach trial and thereby obstruct litigants from
their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 66 This overly aggressive use of summary judgment, unfortunately, appears to have become
common since the 1986 trilogy and undermines the Supreme Court's
long history of deference to a litigant's constitutional right to a jury
trial.
defendant/movant did not satisfy its "heavy burden of persuasion" of showing plaintiff/
nonmovant's inequitable conduct); Foster v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1187, 1195-1196
(10th Cir. 2002) (reversing summary judgment where the defendantlmovant did not satisfy
its burden of setting forth "clear and convincing evidence" of retaliatory discharge).
61.

See Miller, supra note 24, at 1051.

62. Florida is not one of those states. See Lich v. N.C.J. Investment Company, 728
So.2d 1191, 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (J. Altenbernd, dissenting); Green v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 626 So.2d 974, 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
63. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493 (2001); Kourouvacilis v.
General Motors Corp., 575 N.E.2d 734 (Mass. 1991); Y.G. & L.G. v. Jewish Hospital of St.
Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 495, n 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
America, 666 A.2d 146 (N.J. 1995); Orme School v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. 1990); Byrd
v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993); Graffv. Malawer, 592 A.2d 1038 (D.C. 1991).
64.

Miller, supra note 24, at 1041.

65. See Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1997); Nicely v. McBrayer,
McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, 163 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir 1998).
66.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
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THE APPLICATION OF THE TRILOGY IS UNDERMINING THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

An order granting summary judgment that gives lip service the
trilogy, but in reality is founded upon one or more of the improper
grounds discussed in Section III herein, denies the non-moving party
his or her constitutional right to a jury trial, an important part of
which is the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. As discussed in
Section II herein, prior to the trilogy in 1986, the Supreme Court repeatedly acted to accord the Seventh Amendment respect and scope
67
consistent with Rule 38(a).
The 1986 trilogy, however, did not and should not undermine
that longstanding commitment to protect the jury trial right. In Anderson, the Court stated that "[olur holding.., does not denigrate the
role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge .... ,"68 In Celotex, the majority stated that "Rule 56 must be
construed with due regard... for the rights of persons asserting claims
and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims
and defenses tried before a jury . . "69
Indeed, since the trilogy, the Court has reaffirmed the importance of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in several contexts, including breach of a collective bargaining agreement and breach
of union duties in a labor law matter,70 a copyright infringement matter, 7 1 an action by a Chapter 11 trustee to void fraudulent transfers in
a bankruptcy proceeding, 72 and an equal protection and due process
matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 73 More recently, in the case of
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,7 4 the Supreme Court held that, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss, a discrimination plaintiff need not plead
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more evidence than he or she must prove to succeed on the merits at
75
trial.
Unfortunately, the decisions of a significant and growing number of other courts have employed an overly zealous application of the
Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy that deprives litigants of their constitutional jury trial right. As one commentator has opined, it is time for
the Supreme Court to intercede, and re-affirm this Court's commitment to a litigant's constitutional right to a jury trial, to reduce the
confusion apparent in the case law, and to prevent misapplications of
Rule 56:
Taking decisionmaking authority from juries runs counter to basic
and long-cherished principles of our system. One primary function
of the jury has been to make commonsense determinations about
human behavior, reasonableness, and state of mind based on objective standards, the paradigm being the reasonable person standard.
Since the Supreme Court trilogy, there is evidence that these responsibilities have been taken away from juries by pretrial disposition even when none of the possible justifications for restricting
jury trial discussed in this Article are present. Given the existing,
convoluted jurisprudence, it is imperative that the Supreme Court
provide some clarity rather than leaving76the matter entirely to the
genial anarchy of trial court discretion.
Several other commentators have expressed similar observations regarding the encroachment of improper grants of summary judgment on
77
the constitutional right to a jury trial.
The importance of a trial by jury to our system of justice is
found in the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses before a
jury:
[I]t is particularly difficult for the nonmoving party to challenge the
"self-serving testimony" of the moving party without the benefit of
trial accessories, namely cross-examination ....

Only through live

cross examination can the fact-finder observe the demeanor of a
witness, and assess his credibility. A cold transcript of a deposition
is generally no substitute because it cannot unmask the veracity of
a testifying witness clad in a costume of deception; it cannot unveil
that a seemingly well-groomed witness is coming apart at the
seams: "that he fidgets when answering critical questions, his eyes
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shift from the floor to the ceiling, and 78
he manifests all other indicia
traditionally attributed to perjurers."
These sentiments echo those raised by the Supreme Court in Poller
pertaining to the importance of cross-examination of adverse witnesses
in antitrust and other cases where "motive and intent play leading
roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and
hostile witnesses thicken the plot." 79 The Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial is especially important in cases in which the state of mind
of an adverse party is a critical or central issue, and effective crossexamination may affect the outcome of the proceeding. "Much depends
on the credibility of the witnesses testifying as to their own states of
mind. In these circumstances the jury should be given an opportunity
to observe the demeanor, during direct and cross-examination, of the
witnesses whose states of mind are at issue." s0
V.

CONCLUSION

Litigants continue to be denied their Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial by the lower courts by misapplication of Rule 56. District
courts and circuit courts of appeals continue to overstep the permissible boundaries of summary judgment, thereby invading the province of
the jury. The barrier to jury trials in federal court is becoming more
and more formidable in federal practice today. As more and more cases
are being resolved improperly by summary judgment "trial by affidavit," a litigant's constitutional right to a jury trial, which is the cornerstone of our county's civil justice system, is being grossly undermined.
Accordingly, it is critical that the Supreme Court take action to
strike the proper balance between the objectives of the summary judgment procedure and a litigant's constitutional jury trial right, eliminate the significant inconsistencies that have developed among the
federal courts in the administration of the summary judgment principles articulated in the 1986 trilogy, and provide much needed guidance
to the federal courts on some of the procedural aspects of the trilogy
that have clearly generated confusion.
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